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INTRODUCTION 
 
We live with a complex conceptual inheritance that draws equally 
on the thought of classical Greece, Christianity, and the Enlightenment.  
Oversimplifying greatly, we can say that the Greeks formulated the 
ambition to subject the soul and the state to the order of reason; the 
Christians turned from reason to a will informed by grace; and the 
Enlightenment turned both reason and will toward a new appreciation of 
the ordinary as the object of interest and the limit of experience.1  All of 
these elements continue to inform our experience of the political.  Each 
frames political time differently.  The perspective of reason is that of 
timeless principle: politics is measured against principles of justice 
derived from argument, not experience.  The perspective of will is that 
of history: politics is measured against a past that is understood as a 
kind of sacred self-revelation of the community.  The perspective of 
interest is that of the present: politics is measured by markets.  The 
confusion over the temporal character of our political life results from 
theorists and practitioners taking one perspective as the “truth,” and 
viewing the others as mere fictions or confusions.  In fact, we live 
within multiple incommensurable symbolic frameworks.  In different 
contexts, we are likely to appeal to different frameworks—principle, 
history, or interest.  Theorists may be uncomfortable with the inability 
to give a single account of our political lives, but citizens of the modern 
state usually live comfortably within these multiple worlds.  They can 
speak of a universal order of justice, of the patriotic virtues, and of the 
satisfaction of interests.  Each of these normative frameworks supports a 
different conception of the international: a global order of human rights, 
a competition between sovereign nation-states, and global markets. 
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 1 See CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY 
285-302 (1989). 
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Because market approaches dominate so much of contemporary 
analysis, I will have little to say about this perspective in this essay.2  
Instead, I will focus on the other two perspectives: reason and will.  
Many of the differences between political theorists and constitutional 
theorists can best be understood as grounded in the different priorities 
they assign to these distinct perspectives.  At the present moment, for 
example, their dispute often seems to center on the concept of 
sovereignty.  The political theorists increasingly are abandoning the 
concept of sovereignty, which only acts as a break on the emergence of 
a liberal order of rights and markets of global scope.3  Constitutional 
theorists cannot do without the concept of sovereignty, for theirs is a 
world in which “we the people” create and maintain the nation.4  My 
ambition in this essay is not just to elaborate the different perspectives 
of justice and law, but to weigh in on the side of law.  Modern political 
theorists have been so busy with the content of justice, they have failed 
to do justice to our own culture of sovereignty through the rule of law.5  
They move too quickly from an idea of justice to a vision of universal 
law.6   
 
I.     MODERN POLITICAL THEORY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 
 
Modern political theory begins with the formulation of a particular 
narrative: the social contract.  Theorizing politics from an imaginary 
point of origin is by no means a new enterprise.  Plato, too, thought that 
the way to investigate justice was to construct “a city in speech,” by 
which he meant to imagine the origins of the political order as men 
come together to meet their needs.7  The modern account differs from 
Plato’s, however, in at least four respects: (1) it rejects the idea that 
political formations are organic; (2) it adopts an internal point of view; 
(3) it assumes a methodological individualization; and (4) it aims to 
derive a normative standard against which to measure actual polities. 
 
 2 For a more complete account, see PAUL W. KAHN, PUTTING LIBERALISM IN ITS PLACE 
145-82 (2005). 
 3 See, e.g., STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999); Stephen 
D. Krasner, Problematic Sovereignty, in PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY 1 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 
2001). 
 4 See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); AKIL REED 
AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY (2005); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE 
THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); JED RUBENFELD, 
REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2005); 
MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999). 
 5 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
 6 See, e.g., CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
(1979); THOMAS W. POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS (1989). 
 7 PLATO, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 46 (Allan Bloom ed. & trans., 1991). 
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Plato describes the rise and fall, the life cycle, of the well-ordered 
city.  However he does not believe that one can simply freeze that 
movement at one point in order to maintain a just city.  To stop the life 
cycle is no more possible for cities than for men, who also live through 
a complete life cycle from birth to death.  Plato’s imagined city is 
fundamentally organic because it develops according to an internal 
logic.  The character of the metaphor of the organic state shifts from 
classical to pre-modern Europe, but the idea of an internal, natural order 
to the political remains.  Political order will develop or decline on its 
own rhythms.  
The first point to be made about the social contract is that it rejects 
this whole complex of ideas about the state as an organic body.  
Political authority is not natural, but rather is a consequence of the finite 
actions of rulers and ruled.  The state is a product of human artifice.  As 
such, it can be made well or poorly.  The state’s problems are neither 
inevitable nor a mark of sin, rather they are always subject to repair. 
Second, Plato’s effort at political construction is always written 
from the point of view of an observer.  Understanding something for 
him meant to identify its intelligible form within the changing material 
of becoming.  The modern social contract tradition locates the theorist 
within the descriptive enterprise.  He asks, what are the terms of 
association to which a rational agent would agree, i.e., what are the 
terms to which he, as author, would agree?  The author writes as the 
universal, rational agent.  Plato can write of the need for the state to 
deploy a “noble lie” if it is to bring order to the mix of individuals 
within it.  The pre-modern European state too is founded on a mystery 
of sacred authority impenetrable to the ordinary person.  The social 
contract can countenance no such lies or mysteries; it is fully 
transparent to all members of the polity. 
Third, Plato assumes that individuals are formed by the city and 
that the problem of politics is to assure that individuals remain means to 
the polity’s ends.8  This remains true of the pre-modern state: the order 
of the political is not simply the aggregation of the ordinary interests of 
the individual.  The ends of the polity work in the dimension of 
history—power—not individual welfare.  Plato refers to a city with the 
latter horizon as “a city of pigs.”  The social contract turns this around, 
asking not how the state creates useful individuals but under what 
conditions individuals will agree to create political authority.  Its 
horizon is first life itself—Hobbes—and second individual welfare—
Rawls. 
Fourth, the end of Plato’s inquiry into political order is not the 
 
 8 The problem for philosophy is to ask whether the good citizen can be a good man. 
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normative evaluation of the city, but the nature of justice in the 
individual soul.  What is to be remade is not the state, but the individual.  
pre-modern, European politics remained embedded in the sacred.  The 
social contract, on the other hand, is about reshaping politics, not the 
soul.  If political authority is the product of individual acts of 
authorization (delegation), then the terms under which it is created 
remain relevant as the normative measure of its actual performance.  
Authority can be removed as well as created.  It is justly removed when 
it violates the terms of its creation. 
Plato’s inquiry, no less than the modern social-contract tradition, 
represents an effort to subject political order to the scrutiny of reason.  
Both agree that reason’s method is to observe the coming together of 
the elementary parts of a complex entity.  But despite his narration of 
construction, Plato does not have the idea that actual political organisms 
can be freely constructed on the basis of reason.  This, however, is the 
ambition of the modern social contract tradition.  This is the source of 
the modernist urge to build the political community from an imagined 
state of nature in which all that we can rely upon is our ability to reason 
and all that we can be sure of is that we confront a world of need and 
threat.  The modern political task is to construct order from first 
principles that would be self-evidently valid to all rational persons who 
must establish a polity under the predictable conditions of material need 
and moderate scarcity of resources.9 
From the beginning of the modern period, the ideal of the social 
contract has done double duty; it is theory directed at practice.  Social 
contract theorists are philosophers of revolution regardless of their own 
political temperaments.  Their theories ground the possibility of 
revolution, which is understood as the reenactment of the social 
contract.  Thus, a politics that operates under the idea of the social 
contract is one that operates under the threat of revolution.  If authority 
strays so far from the conditions of its creation that it is beyond the 
possibility of reform, it can and should be radically remade. 
Certain characteristics of political time emerge from this linkage of 
theory and practice in the modern age.  It is the time frame of the civil 
engineer or more broadly of what the Greeks called a “techne.”  It is the 
 
 9 This does not necessarily mean a single empire.  We cannot know in advance how far the 
application of reason will take us in the construction of political order.  It may leave room for 
substantial variation within general parameters; it may set out alternative structures that are 
sensitive to contexts.  If a plurality of reasonable states is possible, then the problem of creating 
an order of reason replicates itself in considering the proper relations among states.  Thus, Rawls 
follows his works on the justice within a state with a work on justice among states, once again 
deploying his version of the social contract—the veil of ignorance.  See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW 
OF PEOPLES (1999).  Ackerman and Habermas are similarly inclined to advance from the liberal 
state to a liberal international order.  See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World 
Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771 (1997); Jürgen Habermas, The European Nation-State: On 
the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship, 10 PUB. CULTURE 397 (1998). 
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time frame of “projects.”  The engineer forms his projects by an appeal 
to timeless principles.  In the one case, it is the science of mechanics, in 
the other the science of politics.  Actual projects translate more or less 
well the timeless principles into particular arrangements.  The principles 
remain the measure of the actual, which in turn is always subject to 
reform, and, if need be, to discard and reconstruction.  We see this 
frame of reference in Jefferson’s appeal to “self-evident” principles or 
in the Federalist papers effort to provide the logic of the Constitution’s 
political arrangements.  The history of the state has no value in itself, 
but only insofar as it too can serve as an epistemic resource: we may be 
able to learn something about principles by studying our own past.  
Politics may be an inductive, as well as a deductive, science.  Madison 
came to Philadelphia having studied the history of past republics, not 
just the history of the American colonies. 
As any number of constitutional theorists have pointed out, this 
picture, drawn from modern political theory and the revolutionary 
character of modernity, does not easily match our practice of the rule of 
law.  Constitutional theory must explain a practice, which is partially 
informed by the modernist character of thought, but which remains 
embedded in a pre-modern structure of meaning.  While political theory 
has developed ever more refined versions of the social contract, 
constitutional theorists have struggled to find a way to connect a 
practice of legal reasoning from a determinate text to the abstract 
products of the political theorists.  Early efforts to theorize across these 
perspectives gave us the Bickelian vision of the judge, who 
opportunistically deploys the insights of theory to reform legal 
doctrine.10  More recent efforts have looked for a synthesis of liberalism 
and republicanism, producing Ackermanian dualism or Dworkin’s 
linkage of principle and fit.11 
For the most part, I believe these are efforts to square the circle, to 
resolve an unresolvable paradox.  The problems run extremely deep, for 
American constitutionalism as a practice challenges not just a set of 
norms, but the entire style of liberal thought represented by the social 
contract tradition.  We need to theorize the constitutional state from a 
perspective that does not assume the priority of reason, of the 
individual, and of reform.  That is a large task.12  Here, I want to set the 
basic terms of this alternative model, contrast it with the liberalism of 
the social contract tradition, and indicate how the alternative makes 
better sense of the temporal structures that we find within our practice 
 
 10 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS (2d ed. 1986).  
 11 See ACKERMAN, supra note 4; RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986). 
 12 See KAHN, supra note 2. 
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of constitutionalism. 
II.     POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY: REDISCOVERING THE WILL 
 
The classical Greeks first conceived of a hierarchy of faculties 
within the soul and projected that logos of the psyche onto the order of 
the state.  To the classical philosopher, the problem for both the state 
and the individual was to subordinate the intemperate desires of the 
moment to the conclusions of principled deliberation.  Plato’s 
philosopher-king is just one version of this common assumption that 
political rule and self-rule are both a function of reason, and ideally, the 
identical function.  Early Christians recoiled from these claims for 
reason, believing that the most important truths were beyond the 
capacity of man’s limited understanding.  Man stood in need of 
revelation.  The paradox of establishing the political conditions for the 
rule of reason is displaced by the paradox of the human condition: how 
can finite man achieve the infinite?  This paradox could no longer be 
overcome by the accident that a king may come to have an interest in 
philosophy—Plato’s answer—or by the cultivation of virtuous habits—
Aristotle’s answer—but only by divine intervention.  This belief in 
revelation required a reconceptualization of the faculties of the soul, and 
thus a different ordering of psyche and polity. 
No element of the classical conception of the soul had as its object 
anything like revelation.13  Revelation as a new source of substantive 
truth led to the introduction of the faculty of will.  The Christian 
conception of the will is best understood as the faculty of the soul that 
corresponds to the substantive idea of grace.  Will is the potential to 
realize God’s grace.  It is the faculty by which one puts the soul into a 
condition to receive that grace.  The failure of the will is no longer 
weakness before temptation or the lack of habits that support political 
virtues like courage and moderation.  The failure of the will now is that 
fall from grace which the Christian experiences as sin. 
No amount of pursuit of the classical virtue of justice through the 
rule of reason will bring the soul into the presence of the sacred.  The 
wise man may still be fallen.  Grace is the response of an omnipotent 
God to the act of willed confession by the individual.  By confession, I 
refer not just to the ritual of the Catholic Church, but more broadly to a 
purification and opening to the sacred.  Through will one puts oneself in 
a position to receive grace.  Confession marks the turning of the will 
toward God, by abandoning the finite self.  This is will beyond reason 
and without desire.  As Simon Weil writes, “[g]race fills empty spaces, 
 
 13 See M.B. Forster, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and the Rise of Modern Natural 
Science, 43 MIND 446 (1934). 
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but it can only enter where there is a void to receive it, and it is grace 
itself which makes this void.”14  Confession is the paradigmatic act of 
speech in a Christian metaphysics of the will.  It is a speech that brings 
one to the edge of the sacred, while recognizing that speech cannot 
cross the boundary.  Thus, the deliberative community of the Greek 
polis is displaced by the confessional community of the Church. 
The will is that capacity man must have in a world in which 
meaning is wholly within the possession of God’s act of grace.  In an 
echo of the Platonic homology of city/man, the reconceived soul of man 
now operates in a new homology of God/man.  Thus, just as will 
represents the openness of man to revelation, will is the source of 
revelation in God.  God wills the world into existence; every 
manifestation of the divine is a renewed expression of God’s will.  No 
longer reason, but will binds the world into a single whole. 
For the Greeks, the problem of the will was conceived as that of 
controlling a weak will—a will that would not comply with the 
demands of reason even when one knew what should be done.  
Accordingly, the virtues of the will were temperance and courage, the 
capacity to do what was right under extreme conditions of either 
pleasure or pain.15  But what was right remained a matter of reason.  
Training of the will was a matter of forming correct habits within a 
context of reasonable community expectations.  These habits could then 
be relied upon when circumstances became strained.  This normative 
sensibility led the Greeks to produce the first works of history in the 
West.  These works presented narratives of heroic actions, i.e., of 
overcoming weakness of the will by deploying the virtues of reason 
under extreme conditions.  This, for example, was the special virtue of 
Odysseus. 
In his autobiography, Augustine describes his confrontation with, 
and ultimate rejection of, this classical conception of the will.  The 
experience he describes begins from the problem of weakness of the 
will: akrasia.  Despite his education, and despite his powers of 
deliberation, he is without the power to form his character under the 
guidance of reason.  Indeed, reason just makes matters worse.  It 
becomes a source of radical doubt.  Augustine is the first to record the 
experience of existential angst.16  Existence itself has become a 
problem, and the only answer to this problem is through a faith that 
reaches beyond reason. 
 
 14 SIMONE WEIL, GRAVITY AND GRACE 55 (1952). 
 15 See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. III, chs. 6-12 (David Ross et al. eds., 1998). 
 16 SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE CONFESSIONS OF SAINT AUGUSTINE bk. VII, ch. xxi, at 27 
(Edward B. Pusey trans., 1999); see also TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 131 (“It is hardly an 
exaggeration to say that it was Augustine who introduced the inwardness of radical reflexivity 
and bequeathed it to the Western tradition of thought.”). 
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A polity organized on the principles of reason can never do more 
than replicate the limits of the individual soul and the incompleteness of 
finite efforts at justice.  Organized political life comes to be seen, 
therefore, as the condition of fallen man.  This corrupt political life is to 
be transcended in a new community of faith.  Modern politics continues 
to bear remnants of this Christian idea of the corruption of the body.  
Politics, we often feel, is all too much of this world.  When we take up 
politics, we inevitably dirty our hands. 
The state too must have a will, if it is to become a possible 
representation of the divine.  Politics is no longer a matter of justice 
under the guidance of reason, but of faith within a community of those 
sharing a common will.  This idea of a community of the faithful begins 
in the Church, but becomes central to the Western concept of 
nationhood and its tenets of patriotism, loyalty, and, indeed, treason.  A 
political community is not merely an organized structure for the 
development and deployment of reason.  Its foundation lies in will, not 
reason.  Modern political thought expressed this idea in the notion of 
“sovereignty.”  The sovereign is the point of reification of the common 
will of the nation.  The sovereign has will, not reason and not desire.  
Indeed, we come to the idea of the sovereign through that of the will: 
because there must be a national will, there must be a subject in 
possession of that will.  This is the sovereign. 
For centuries, the sovereign will was quite literally embodied in a 
subject: the monarch was the mystical corpus of the state.  That 
incorporation borrowed explicitly from Christology.  The sovereign did 
not just claim a “divine right” to rule—a claim about the derivation of 
legitimacy.  Rather, the sovereign was an appearance of the divine.  He 
or she was Christ-like, in claiming, for example, a miraculous power to 
heal the sick.17  This substantive claim of the monarch cannot survive 
the desacralization of the modern world.  Yet the understanding of the 
form of the sovereign will remains. 
The deeper point that survives the death of the king concerns the 
operation of the metaphysics of the will in the construction of the 
community’s self-understanding.  Just as the will of the individual 
appears in and through a metaphysics of faith, so too does the will of the 
nation.  The nation is a community of faith.  To this, the idea of 
sovereignty is critical, while the representation of the sovereign in the 
monarch is not.  The monarch claimed to be the “mystical corpus of the 
state,” but was vulnerable to competing symbolic representations of the 
national will.  The sovereign as mystical corpus survives long after 
monarchs disappear.  Revolution kills the king, but also announces the 
presence of a new sovereign: We the People. 
 
 17 See MICHAEL WALZER, REGICIDE AND REVOLUTION: SPEECHES AT THE TRIAL OF LOUIS 
XVI, at 1-8 (Michael Walzer ed., Marian Rothstein trans., 1974). 
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The social contract of the political theorists fails to understand the 
foundation of sovereignty in the metaphysics of the will.  These 
theorists are likely to see popular sovereignty as a voting mechanism, 
rather than as an expression of a faith in a transtemporal, plural subject.  
They see a two-termed world of reason and interest.  But that is exactly 
their problem: theories of politics are produced that fail to grasp the 
distinctive character of modern politics—a character founded on the 
will.  Prior to the will, there was no sovereign.  Without sovereignty, we 
do not have modern politics.18 
These sources point in very different directions when we theorize 
about values and sources of meaning.  Reason points toward the 
universal; will points toward the history of a confessional community.  
Reason appears with a kind of timelessness; will appears in and through 
the narrative of a uniquely valued community.  Individual subjects, as 
well as the collective polity, orient themselves in both of these 
dimensions, that of timeless truth—the perspective of justice—and that 
of historical continuity—the perspective of nationalism and sacrifice.  
Each generates a different attitude toward the future into which the 
polity is moving: the reformist ambition of reaching closer and closer to 
an ideal of justice, or the maintenance of an historical legacy.  Similarly, 
each generates a different perspective on the relationship between self 
and others.  That relationship moves from contract to sacrifice.19 
 
III.     POLITICS AND THE METAPHYSICS OF WILL 
 
The social contract tradition is caught in a kind of dialectic of 
reason and interest: is the end of politics justice or economic well 
being?  Yet, modern political experience has been centrally a 
phenomenon of the will.  The more we take the perspective of the will, 
the more we emphasize a normative perspective that places a revelatory 
act at the foundation of the community’s self-understanding.  This is a 
politics that borrows from the religious linkage of will and revelation.  
Faculty and object provide two perspectives on a single experience of 
meaning.  Grace is a function of will, and will a function of grace.  The 
tendency of early Christian thought to collapse across this line, such that 
man becomes a part of the divine, was a danger resisted as a form of 
 
 18 See ULRICH K. PREUSS, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION: THE LINK BETWEEN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND PROGRESS (Deborah Lucas Schneider trans., 1995) (discussing velvet 
revolutions of 1989 as efforts to depoliticize). 
 19 A complete account must add the perspective of interest, modeled on bodily desire.  This is 
presentist, particular, and contractual.  It models politics on a market. 
 268 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 28:1 
heresy.20  The rise of modern political theology, however, embraces this 
heresy.  The revelatory act—the moment of grace—is now that of self-
revelation by the popular sovereign.  In the politics of the nation-state, 
man—understood as the popular sovereign—has become divine.  The 
source of the state’s creation is the will of the popular sovereign.  That 
will reveals only itself: faculty and object have become identical. 
The modern, democratic polity is founded on a transcendent act of 
self-revelation: revolution.  The political value of revolution cannot be 
explained either by appeal to abstract norms—justice—or by analysis of 
the empirical causes—material need—leading to revolution at a 
particular moment in time.  Revolution is not the effect of any cause, 
although the circumstances that are the occasion for revolution can be 
described.  They are not its cause, because replication of those 
circumstances will not necessarily lead to revolution.  At best, those 
circumstances “invite” revolution.  Revolution breaks into ordinary time 
as a new moment of creation.  It can never be reduced to its antecedent 
causes; nor can it be exhausted in the subsequent history it makes 
possible.  It is politics in the form of a democratic metaphysics of the 
will. 
Whether a modern nation-state can exist without a revolutionary 
consciousness is an open question.  Even nations as ethnically and 
culturally stable as France or England maintain a narrative of popular 
revolution.  More importantly, every modern nation-state believes that it 
is subject to a potential revolution—a new mobilization of the sovereign 
people outside of law.  Constitutions may not have sunset clauses, but 
neither can they declare illegitimate an investment of the popular 
sovereign in a new constitution.  This is part of the nation-state’s sense 
of its own democratic legitimacy.  Indeed, it is a necessary structure of 
the contemporary idea of a political will.  The will of the popular 
sovereign is always deeper and richer than its particular terms of 
expression in a constitution.21  That will is an inexhaustible source of 
meaning for the state. 
Successful revolution is followed by constitutional construction.  
Constitutional construction will necessarily appeal to reason for 
guidance, but the authority of a constitution derives not from reason but 
from will.  The constitution preserves that sacred appearance of the 
popular sovereign and organizes political life around it.  The 
constitution provides access to the sovereign revelation, but is never 
 
 20 The idea that matter is nothing but a deterioration of the spirit is central to Gnostic thought, 
as well as the idea that man’s end is a return and reunion with the Godhead. 
 21 This intuition of the limits of law leads Carl Schmitt to locate sovereignty at the point of 
the power to declare an “exception” to legal rule.  See CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: 
FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY (George Schwab trans., MIT Press 1985) 
(1922). 
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fully adequate to it.  It translates into the idiom of the ordinary the 
extraordinary experience of revolution.  This juxtaposition of the 
extraordinary and the ordinary produces the problems of constitutional 
hermeneutics.  On the one hand, constitutions appear as law, to which 
the ordinary canons of legal construction should apply.  On the other 
hand, constitutions appear as an endless resource of self-understanding 
for the state.  They preserve that original act of self-revelation by the 
popular sovereign. 
From the standpoint of reason, there is not a substantial difference 
between reform and revolution.  A gradualist agenda of reform can 
produce, over time, a political order that is as just as the outcome of 
dramatic revolutionary change.  The common law evolution of a 
political order—for example, in England—may compete on the scale of 
reason and justice with the revolutionary constitutional construction of 
the United States.22  Only from the perspective of the will does 
revolution show itself to be different in kind from reform.23 
Theorists who ignore the place of the will in American 
constitutionalism are likely to assimilate the constitutional tradition of 
Supreme Court adjudication to the common law working out of the 
order of reason.24  Analogical reasoning is at work in constitutional 
adjudication not as a part of an inductive science, but rather because 
every interpretation of the Constitution aims to make present, to 
illuminate, the expression of the popular sovereign.  Every judicial 
opinion has the same source of authority, the same hermeneutic 
ambition.  Accordingly, interpretation can begin at any place in the 
corpus because all point back to the same authoritative source.  This has 
less to do with the evolution of reason through the mechanism of 
judicial practice, than with the transparency of interpretation to its 
object. 
Comparing the originalism of revolution to the original position of 
Rawlsian liberalism, we see two quite different normative structures.  
One we value because it is ours; the other because it is no one’s in 
particular.  One has value because it happened; the other has value only 
as a regulative ideal.  This produces a paradox in the constitutional 
 
 22 William Gladstone expressed this idea: “[A]s the British Constitution is the most subtile 
organism which has proceeded from the womb and the long gestation of progressive history, so 
the American Constitution is . . . the most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the 
brain and purpose of man.”  William Gladstone, Kin Beyond Sea, 127 N. AM. REV. 179, 185 
(1878). 
 23 Failure to recognize this difference in conceptual models produces the normative confusion 
of Ackerman’s dualism.  He needs a theory of the will, but does not want to abandon his liberal 
commitment to reason.  See Paul W. Kahn, Community in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 
99 YALE L.J. 1 (1989). 
 24 See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 
877 (1996). 
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jurisprudence of democratic self-governance: the more the nation 
believes itself to be a product of the will of the popular sovereign, the 
less democratic it becomes—if we mean by democratic, subject to 
control through broadly participatory electoral mechanisms.  
Constitutional law maintains the revelatory act of the popular sovereign, 
which may not make direct contact with the contemporary wishes of a 
majority of the electorate.  American constitutional theory has been 
focused on this problem since Alexander Bickel first labeled it the 
“counter-majoritarian difficulty.”25  This is the modern form of 
Rousseau’s distinction of the general will from the will of all.26  The 
distinction will never survive the scrutiny of reason; it rests on a 
metaphysics of the will. 
Originalism as a mode of constitutional thought is inseparable from 
this experience of self-revelation by the popular sovereign.27  American 
debates over the appropriate form of constitutional interpretation always 
occur within a broadly originalist framework.  All participants in the 
debate take seriously the claim that constitutionalism is a matter of 
giving effect to a text with its own history.  All ask what it means to be 
“true” to the text.28  Originalism is sometimes presented as a doctrine 
designed to constrain judicial activism.29  Not only does this seem false 
as a practical matter,30 but it fails to explain the passion with which 
originalism is pursued.  The powerful attraction of originalism is in the 
effort to preserve and make operational a sacred, revelatory past.  The 
nonoriginalist does not challenge this end, so much as the manner in 
which that sacred past can continue to live in the present.  This whole 
endeavor is a form of practical reasoning that appears simply irrational 
from the perspective of reason.  Appeals to originalism seem a 
methodological category mistake to the liberal theoretician.  But this is 
only because it is the mode of interpretation deployed by will, and 
against reason.  We cannot measure faith by logic.  The sacred is always 
beyond reason. 
 
 25 BICKEL, supra note 10, at 16-23. 
 26 See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT OR PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL 
RIGHT & DISCOURSE ON POLITICAL ECONOMY 45-47 (Charles M. Sherover ed. & trans., Harper 
& Row 1984) (1817). 
 27 This is not to suggest that originalism is the only legitimate mode of constitutional 
interpretation.  On the dialectical relationship between originalist and non-originalist 
interpretations of a “sacred” text, see PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW: MARBURY V. MADISON 
AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA 220 (1997). 
 28 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993) 
(critiquing a hermeneutics of strict originalism in the name of an originalist value). 
 29 See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 
IND. L.J. 1 (1971). 
 30 Consider, for example, the contemporary revolution in federalism doctrine.  See United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down federal legislation as exceeding 
congressional Commerce Clause powers); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) 
(same). 
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Will privileges the narrative of self-creation of a particular 
community.  There is no universal will; no will in the abstract.  On this 
view, the origins of the political community represent a perfect state of 
grace, in which there is a complete transparency of the individual will to 
the sovereign will.  This revolutionary community has a kind of 
transtemporal existence: all individuals—present and future—
participate as members of the popular sovereign.  For this reason, the 
actions of the Founders can continue to bind future generations: all are 
part of a single We.  The atemporality of Christ has moved from church, 
to sovereign monarch, to the popular sovereign.  Such a nation cannot 
be conceived on the model of reason or interest.  It is the product of a 
revolutionary act of will that has become a self-validating source of 
revelation.  It is the nation-state that becomes a church in which all 
citizens are part of the body, the mystical corpus, of the state. 
Reason’s role in a system of the will is neither that of identifying 
universal truths nor that of discovering the implicit logic of a market 
order; its method is neither deductive nor inductive.  Rather, reason’s 
task is hermeneutical: it must interpret manifestations of the sacred.  
Hermeneutics had its origins in the recognition that there is a unique 
demand on reason in the interpretation of a biblical text.  A 
constitutionalism of popular sovereignty requires a similar approach to 
the sacred text of the civic religion.  The task of political hermeneutics 
is to explain who we are as a community that has engaged in an act of 
self-creation.  Its object is “we the people,” never we, the present voters.  
In its judicial form, hermeneutics interprets the constitutional text as the 
material representation of the sovereign people.  Thus, the Supreme 
Court aims to speak in the voice of the sovereign people.  If it fails, if it 
speaks only in the contemporary voice of politics, it is without 
legitimacy.31  Constitutional hermeneutics treats the text not as a source 
of just political principles, but as the revelatory source of our deepest 
common meaning.32  In its nonjudicial form, this same subordination of 
reason to the metaphysics of the will produces the political rhetoric of 
sacrifice: the call to the individual citizen to realize his or her deepest 
meaning in the giving over of the self wholly to the maintenance of the 
sacred meaning of the state. 
Political rhetoric does not call the individual to sacrifice for the 
rule of a universal ideal of justice, nor for satisfaction of the interests of 
 
 31 See KAHN, supra note 27, at 208-09.  For many, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), 
exemplified such a failure. 
 32 For examples of two classic forms of constitutional misreading, consider Beard’s interest 
analysis, and Perry’s turn to human rights.  Neither makes contact with our constitutional practice 
as a hermeneutics of popular sovereignty.  See CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC 
INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913); MICHAEL J. PERRY, 
THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982). 
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any particular citizen or group of citizens.  It is a call to be as a part of 
the transtemporal unity of the state that is the popular sovereign.  Just as 
liberal political thought cannot understand reason as hermeneutics, it 
has no understanding of the rhetoric of political sacrifice—except as a 
dangerous appeal to irrational passion.  Nevertheless, a state that 
operated without constitutional hermeneutics or political rhetoric would 
be a post-modern political form that made little contact with the politics 
of the nation-state as we have experienced it over the last two centuries.  
It imagines the global reach of both laws based on reason and a market 
based on interests.  Will disappears from political ontology.  For many, 
of course, this sounds like the appropriate aspiration in an era of 
globalization.  Faith is eliminated from politics in the same way that it 
has been eliminated from science.  The sovereign will as the source of 
political creation, hermeneutics as the method of reasoning, and 
sacrifice as attitude toward the body’s interests are all remnants of the 
Judeo-Christian faith that have become part of our secular political 
tradition. 
The politics of modern nation-states remains a world of symbols 
and miraculous appearances.  The body of the citizen is to become a 
symbol—a point at which the popular sovereign shows itself by 
displacing interest.  This is a politics of citizen sacrifice, which ranges 
from the battlefield, to the voting booth, to the courtroom.  A virtuous 
political citizen willingly sacrifices his or her own interests.  Sacrifice 
may appear first as the language of warfare, but it is more generally the 
language of “public spiritedness.”  Thus, the general form of the 
pathology of modern politics is the pursuit of “special interests.”  
Church and nation-state are always calling on us to overcome the 
individualism of interest.  Both appeal to a revelatory past and look 
forward to a redemptive future. 
From the perspective of the will, the most basic structure of 
political reality is the transtemporal community.  For the individual, 
contact with the sacred origins of the community requires an 
overcoming—a sacrifice—of private interests.  The need to act as a 
public citizen is often expressed in contemporary constitutional 
thought.33  The liberal tenor of that thought, however, tends to 
understand this demand on the individual as a precondition for public 
deliberation based on reason.  But reason is no less a problem from the 
perspective of will than is interest.  The political community, founded 
on the will of the popular sovereign, requires a deliberate suspension of 
belief in the powers of a universal reason, no less than it requires a 
sacrifice of individual interests.  Political deliberation is not an abstract 
 
 33 See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 4, at 230-94 (arguing a dualist conception of the “private 
citizen” that includes a public function of higher law making); Cass R. Sunstein, Naked 
Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984). 
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consideration of justice.  It is, instead, the hermeneutic enterprise of 
constitutional interpretation.  The sacred political community exists in 
the traditional paradox of Christianity: by sacrificing the subject, the 
self will be reborn; by abandoning reason and interest, one will find the 
truth. 
Of course, the revolutionary consciousness of the popular 
sovereign makes a claim to justice.  We inevitably bring our abstract 
understandings of justice to the task of performing a revolution, as well 
as to that of subsequently interpreting the meaning of the revolution.  
The popular sovereign must say something; it must produce a text.  
Where else can it look for the content of its discourse than to its moral 
and political ideals?  Thus, the Declaration of Independence speaks of 
“self-evident truths,” which only in retrospect become the revelatory 
speech of the popular sovereign.34  That the American founders located 
their self-evident truths in substantial part in the classic liberal tradition 
is obviously important for the content of the politics of will in our 
tradition.  Yet it is a mistake to see only the form of justice and not the 
politics of the will within which this tradition operates.  The political 
community is not reducible to a collective effort to realize these liberal 
norms.  Politics is not just something that gets in the way of liberalism. 
Similarly, even revolutionary communities must be concerned 
about individual interests.  The demands of the body must be met.  
Politics—even a politics of will—is not a kind of practical eschatology.  
A political community demands sacrifice, but it is not a suicide pact.  
While a politics of will must still respond to the claims of interest and 
reason, these intersections are not only incomplete, they represent a 
kind of boundary crossing as we find ourselves responding to very 
different claims.  Thus, the American politics of the will occurs within a 
general understanding of markets as the means of meeting interests.  
This does not mean that economics displaces the politics of the will, but 
rather that the construction of a narrative of the national will makes 
room for an account of markets.  It means that we are likely to confuse a 
particular form of the organization of production—property and 
markets—with the political narrative of self-revelation.  We will invest 
our markets with more meaning than they can bear in themselves 
because they have been touched by the miraculous speech of the 
popular sovereign. 
The political perspective of will is that of a community whose 
identity is constituted by the narrative of its own self-creation.  History, 
prior to that founding act, lacks meaning.  Pre-revolutionary history 
 
 34 See PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY: SELF-GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 54-55 (1992); HARRY V. JAFFA, CRISIS OF THE HOUSE DIVIDED: AN 
INTERPRETATION OF THE ISSUES IN THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES 227 (1982). 
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gains whatever meaning it has retrospectively, i.e., its meaning is only 
as a kind of preparation for the revolution.  The American colonial 
experience, for example, is not understood as an aspect of British life, 
but as a kind of training for independence.35  The same is true in the 
modern, post-colonial world as each new state makes a claim to its 
colonial past.36  That past is reinscribed in the narrative of revolution; it 
is dispossessed of its place in a competing narrative of empire. 
The birth of the post-colonial state, of which the United States was 
the first and the most successful, was made possible by the metaphysics 
of will.  Revolution breaks the link with a colonial, and even a pre-
colonial, past; it begins history over.  This is the means by which the 
arbitrariness of the boundaries of the post-colonial state—a legacy of 
European, not indigenous, history—is simply eliminated from the 
narrative of political meaning.  Within those boundaries, the popular 
sovereign reveals itself as a self-validating source of political meaning.  
Since the post-colonial state is a legacy of a Western idea of politics that 
traces directly to a Christian conception of the will, it should not be 
surprising that the actual politics of these states has, for the most part, 
failed to match the conceptual foundations of the polity. 
 Only from the perspective of a metaphysics of the will can we 
make sense of much of modern political practice—especially that of the 
United States.  American constitutionalism looks strangely irrational 
and anachronistic to the elites of much of the rest of the modern West 
precisely because we remain enthralled by the perspective of the will.  
Our actual politics remains distinctly less liberal than our political 
theory, because we remain a sacred, political community. 
Of course, American elites, no less than their equivalents in other 
developed countries, are deeply attracted to an emerging regime of 
globalization of markets and of law.  They too see the virtues of reason.  
They too cultivate a sense of transnational—not transtemporal—
identity.  They too speak of the breakdown of traditional political 
boundaries.  Yet, most Americans, and certainly the political leadership,  
remain conflicted over the virtues of globalization.  Particularly so for 
two reasons: first, a deep tradition of constitutional law as a 
hermeneutics of the will; and second, the enduring persistence of a 
belief in American exceptionalism.  These two points are reverse 
images of each other: American exceptionalism is grounded in a 
political psychology that privileges the perspective of the will. 
Even abroad, however, we should not too quickly judge the tenor 
of a nation’s political form by looking only to expressions of political 
 
 35 See, e.g., JON BUTLER, BECOMING AMERICA: THE REVOLUTION BEFORE 1776 (2000). 
 36 See BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND 
SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 170-85 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing maps, museums, and the post-
colonial world). 
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and legal theory.  The European Union, the model of a post-national 
sovereignty community, has hardly begun to displace the sense of 
identity through nationhood in the citizen’s political imagination.  
Europeans may not yet be done with the politics of will, and Americans 
remain firmly in its grasp. 
 
CONCLUSION: THE DIVERSITY OF POLITICAL MEANINGS 
 
There is no single story to be told about contemporary American 
politics.  Three different normative perspectives or world views are set 
in competition: reason and will, which I have elaborated here, as well as 
interest, which I have for the most part ignored.  The competition 
among them shapes many of our deepest political dilemmas at the level 
not just of national policy, but equally at that of the individual and the 
global.  Consider the multiple norms to which the individual citizen 
feels drawn.  He or she simultaneously affirms the virtues of 
participation in public deliberation over the character of justice, of 
satisfaction of interests through participation in a well-functioning 
market, and of responding to a call for sacrifice for the maintenance of 
the state.  At the international level, we affirm the justice of universal 
human rights, the appeal of transnational markets, and the importance of 
state sovereignty. 
We are replicating at the international level just those conflicts of 
faculties, values, and perspectives that we have been managing in our 
conceptions of domestic order since the modern nation-state emerged as 
a product of a revolutionary act expressing the will of the popular 
sovereign in an age of reason, and at a point in time when the promise 
of markets to satisfy the social question first became imaginable.  The 
problems here are not just those of incommensurable values.  Each 
value stands upon an entire metaphysics that grounds a political 
psychology.  We live simultaneously in distinct universes, i.e., among 
diverse symbolic forms.  There is no neutral perspective, no reality, 
separate from the forms themselves. 
Although we can understand the institutions and values produced 
by each, the relationships among reason, will and interest cannot be 
stabilized in any one order.  Consider, for example, the different attitude 
toward the future each adopts.  From the perspective of will, the future 
always poses a threat of corruption, of a falling away from the meaning 
that created and sustains the community.  From the perspective of 
reason, this fear of change is nothing less than submission to the dead-
hand of the past.  Reason looks to a future of endless reform, moving 
ever closer to an ideal order of justice.  Interest rejects both the 
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reverence for the past and the hope for the future, looking to present 
satisfactions; it measures the future in terms of present value. 
What is important to see is that none of this is true in and of itself.  
Nor is it true that the multiple perspectives and structures that we 
deploy constitute a complete account of possibilities, even for ourselves, 
let alone others.  We could, for example, see interest as the product of 
character, and character as the product of a life built within a 
community.  We could locate even the body’s desires in the historical 
narrative of a particular community.37  This is no more right or wrong 
than seeing desire as the domain of sin to be fought against by reason 
and will.  All of our structures of thought have their own histories, their 
own genealogies.  We are in no position to make universal claims when 
our own conceptual resources are so diverse and incommensurable. 
Political theory built on the social contract stabilizes a number of 
conceptual resources available within the Western tradition.  It 
represents a rough melding of normative perspectives of reason and 
interest.  This marriage produces the odd spectacle of competing 
liberalisms that move across a spectrum that extends from libertarianism 
to the social welfare state, from Bentham’s utilitarianism to Rawl’s 
theory of justice.  Different liberalisms can be understood as “local 
equilibria” of these conflicting resources.  This approach explains the 
historical ambiguity in the meaning of liberalism, which points 
simultaneously to a conception of politics founded on notions of 
individual rights and to a market order.  The former emphasizes the role 
of reason in liberal theory, while the latter emphasizes the role of 
interest. 
All of these theories leave out of the account those norms that have 
their origin in the faculty of the will as it enters the Western tradition 
through the experience of Christianity.  Will and grace are the terms of 
our inheritance from a post-classical world of monotheistic values and 
concepts.  In the age of democratic states, there is a collapse of these 
terms: the people, as popular sovereign, endow their own revolutionary 
act of will with its sacred meaning.  Every manifestation of the will of 
the popular sovereign has the aura of grace.  We are a chosen people 
because we will ourselves into being and thus choose ourselves as a 
people.  This is neither a matter of reason nor of interest, but of will and 
of the norms generated by a particular conception of the will.  These 
concepts remain a part of the construction of meaning for the individual 
and the polity within the democratic, constitutional state. 
 
 37 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 15, at bk. II, ch. 1 (character is a function of community’s law). 
